

**TOP SECRET**

9 January 1963

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*Ed*

# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



State Dept. review completed

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
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6. Notes: [redacted]  
USSR - North Vietnam, [redacted]  
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## DAILY BRIEF

\*Congo: [Tshombé may have again succeeded in involving the UN in negotiations, thereby bolstering his weakened political position.]

[Following his return to Elisabethville yesterday, Tshombé issued a communiqué stating that he had come back to restore "calm and peace" and "this essentially consists of the rapid application of the Thant plan without further bloodshed and without useless destruction.]

[While this statement falls short of meeting earlier UN demands, U Thant said in New York yesterday evening that he found it encouraging, would seize upon it to re-establish contact with Tshombé, and would send instructions on this to UN Under Secretary Bunche]

[Tshombé's communiqué--termed "moderate, if vague" by US Consul Dean--was issued only after Bunche and UN representative Gardiner had refused to see the Katangan leader in Elisabethville and had taken off for Leopoldville]

[Statements by Bunche and other UN officials indicate that their reluctance to deal personally with Tshombé is caused largely by a fear of offending Adoula. They have tried to avoid any indication of a willingness to accept Tshombé back as provincial president in Katanga. Although Adoula himself has]

[Said he would accept Tshombé in that capacity-- provided the Katangan assembly approves this--he would probably prefer to see Tshombé's influence and power permanently reduced.]

[A resumption of UN negotiations with Tshombé has been strongly urged by Belgian officials--who were mainly responsible for Tshombé's return to Elisabethville--as well as by the British. Both Brussels and London probably believe that Tshombé had the choice of remaining in Kolwezi with eventual defeat certain, or of returning to Elisabethville and salvaging his position as provincial president by embracing the UN plan.]

[Union Miniere officials, meanwhile, in widely publicizing Tshombé's threat to destroy their installations at Kolwezi, have improved his position as well as their own. Union Miniere representatives in Leopoldville say that they cannot sign a foreign exchange agreement with Adoula for fear of provoking sabotage at Kolwezi. While the sabotage threat may or may not be a valid one, they have likely insured that no financial agreement will be reached without Tshombé's participation.]

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DAILY BRIEF

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NOTES

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USSR - North Vietnam: Party secretary Y. V. Andropov, who heads the Supreme Soviet delegation which will soon visit Hanoi, will undoubtedly brief North Vietnamese leaders on Khrushchev's strategy for dealing with the Sino-Soviet dispute. Andropov, Moscow's expert on relations with ruling Communist parties, was an active participant in the recent Soviet discussions with President Tito. Andropov's mission, together with party secretary Ilichev's current talks with Mongolian leaders, reflects the importance Khrushchev attaches to the support of these two Asian Communist regimes in any showdown with the Chinese.

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